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ABSTRACT	
An approach to implementing variational Bayesian inference in biological systems is 
considered, under which the thermodynamic free energy of a system directly encodes its 
variational free energy. In the case of the brain, this assumption places constraints on the 
neuronal encoding of generative and recognition densities, in particular requiring a stochastic 
population code. The resulting relationship between thermodynamic and variational free 
energies is prefigured in mind-brain identity theses in philosophy and in the Gestalt 
hypothesis of psychophysical isomorphism. 
	
	
	
	
Introduction	
	
	 Theories of unsupervised learning in the brain invariably appeal, in one way or another, 
to the iterative refinement of a neuronally implemented, hierarchically organized generative 
model of the sensory data. Updates to the generative model can be computed using a cost 
function that measures the mismatch between actual and predicted sensory inputs. This cost 
function is often formally analogous, in some cases quite precisely, to descriptions of physical 
systems in terms of their potential energy [1]. Variational methods, which formalize statistical 
inference and learning in terms of the maximization of a lower bound on the model evidence 
called (negative) variational free energy, are among state-of-the-art approaches in this vein [2], 
and have a long history in the theory of unsupervised learning in artificial neural networks [3,4].  
In theoretical neuroscience, variational free energy (VFE) minimization has been 
proposed as a unifying explanatory framework accounting in principle for all psychologically 
significant aspects of cortical function, particularly those underwriting perception and action 
[5,6,7,8]. This theoretical approach, sometimes called the “free energy principle” (FEP), has 
recently been extended from a theory of the brain to a more general emerging framework that 
treats life in general, at all spatiotemporal scales and developmental stages, in terms of a gradient 
descent on free energy [9,10,11].1 
                                                
1	These	twin	developments	are	of	course	intimately	related,	as	modeling	in	computational	neuroscience	
has	come	increasingly	to	be	informed	by	progress	in	those	branches	of	machine	learning	that	
themselves	take	ongoing	inspiration	from	neuroscience	(i.e.	deep	learning	/	connectionism).	
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In this paper, I consider a way of implementing variational inference in the brain that is 
non-accidentally related to its thermodynamic description. The implications of this perspective 
on variational inference, I argue, are similar to those of positions taken in 20th-century 
philosophy on the mind-brain relation [12,13]. J.J.C. Smart’s [12] “topic-neutral” analysis of 
mental state ascriptions, for example, allowed for the possibility that mental states are (despite 
initial appearances, perhaps) brain states. Similarly, on the present view, the mathematics of 
variational inference delineates a set of formal relations that obtain within a system whether it is 
described cognitively, in terms of the contents of its computational states, or purely physically, in 
terms of the energy dynamics governing the (neuronal) vehicles of its representations. 
This theoretical stance is stronger than that adopted historically by proponents of the 
FEP, who have in some cases underscored the model-relative status of the free energy of 
approximate Bayesian inference [14,15] and its distinctness from thermodynamic free energy. 
Recent work on this topic by Karl Friston and colleagues, however, confirms a systematic link 
between the VFE and thermodynamic potential energy. In [16] it is demonstrated that changes in 
thermodynamic potential energy are approximately equal to changes in the surprisal or self-
information of a system near its non-equilibrium steady states, and [9] (see pp.65-67) describes 
the minimization of thermodynamic free energy as a system approaches non-equilibrium steady 
state. [17] draws a conclusion similar to that of the present work via a somewhat different route.2 
Interestingly, this view was presaged not only by the identity theorists in philosophy but 
also, quite precisely, by the Gestalt psychologists, who supposed that perceptual phenomena as 
subjectively experienced had structures isomorphic to their underlying physiological correlates 
(see e.g. [18], p.56, [19], p.552, and [20]).3  
The outline of this paper is as follows. In §1, I introduce the variational approach to 
Bayesian inference, briefly discuss its technical motivation, and describe its formal and 
conceptual relations to the notion of free energy from statistical mechanics. In §2, I consider how 
probabilities (and state updates) would need to be encoded in neuronal dynamics such that the 
same mathematical description can be applied to the former and to the latter, a necessary 
condition on the truth of the identity thesis. In §3 I discuss how this thesis, which is 
fundamentally a philosophical claim, may be grounded in the mathematics via Lewisian 
functionalism. I conclude by considering the scope and implications of the thesis. 
                                                
2	The	thesis	presented	in	this	paper	was	developed	independently	of	Friston	et	al’s	work	in	[17],	though	
the	two	approaches	are	clearly	complementary.	
3	The	Gestalt	theorists	argued	for	this	isomorphism	from	the	holistic	(“molar”)	nature	of	both	perceptual	
experience	and	physical	processes,	supposing	the	brain	to	behave	more	or	less	as	a	unified	electrostatic	
field	in	which	modification	of	one	part	necessarily	modifies	all	the	others.	Later	in	his	career,	Köhler	
shifted	to	a	version	of	the	view	rooted	in	synaptic	potentials,	which	seems	not	to	be	falsified	by	the	
experiments	historically	used	to	reject	the	isomorphism	thesis	[21].	In	any	case,	the	present	
considerations	amount	to	an	alternative	argument	for	a	similar	conclusion	to	the	Gestaltists’.	
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1	The	formal	equivalence 
	
1.1 Free energy in optimization and in thermodynamics  
	
Free energy, in the context of variational Bayesian inference, is a function(al) of a 
probability distribution or density Q used to approximate the (in practice, typically intractable) 
joint posterior distribution P(h, v) of data v, together with the (unobserved) cause(s) of those 
data, h, under a statistical model.4 In relevant applications in cognitive science, the 
approximating distribution is typically described as a “recognition” model or density (since it can 
be used to recognize causes given sensory inputs) and the approximated distribution as a 
“generative model” (since it can be used to generate states of or predictions for the system’s 
input channel(s), a process that mirrors the causation of sensory input by external sources).  
The negative free energy, F, can be written in the following form (closely following [22], 
but with the dependence of Q on a particular observed variable made explicit), where z is a 
variable that includes both the hidden states h and unknown parameters q of the generative 
model: 
	
F = 𝑄 𝑧|𝑣 log	(*(+,-)/(-|+))-         (1) 
	
Note that the true joint probability of latent and observed variables	𝑃(𝑣, 𝑧) is a function of q, 
which is implicitly represented by Q(z|v), so that F depends only on Q.  
F is useful as an optimization target for several reasons that have been widely discussed. 
Key properties are summarized in Eq. (2), where L = log P(v), the log probability of the data v 
under a generative model of their causes, and DKL(Q(z|v)|P(z|v)) = 𝑄 𝑧|𝑣 ln	(/(-|+)*(-|+))- , the K-L 
divergence between Q and the posterior generative distribution: 
	
DKL(Q(z|v)||P(z|v)) + F =  L       (2) 
	
The K-L divergence quantifies the difference between P and Q, is zero when they are 
identical, and is otherwise positive. Thus, F acts as a lower bound on the log likelihood of the 
data under P. Moreover, holding L fixed, maximizing F necessarily minimizes DKL. These are 
two aspects of a single optimization process in which the data alone is used to infer the best 
                                                
4	Throughout,	I	have	adopted	the	convention	from	connectionist	modeling	of	using	‘v’	for	observed	or	
“visible”	variables,	and	‘h’	for	“hidden”	or	unobserved	variables.	
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possible model5 of it and its hidden causes, making variational inference suitable as a method for 
unsupervised learning. 
As is often remarked in discussions of variational inference, F has almost precisely the 
form of a negative (Helmholtz) free energy from statistical mechanics [1,3,4]. This energy may 
be written as F(T) = <E(T)> - TS, where the first term on the right is the average energy of the 
system (at temperature T) and TS is the temperature times the entropy S ([23], p.673). To see the 
equivalence, we rewrite Eq. (1) using an “energy” term E(v, z) defined as the negative log joint 
probability of v and z under the generative model. Reversing signs and expanding the log 
expression gives the following (using the label VFE for the (variational) free energy, as opposed 
to the negative free energy, F):	
	
VFE = 𝑄 𝑧|𝑣 𝐸(𝑣, 𝑧)- − (− 𝑄 𝑧|𝑣 log	(𝑄 𝑧|𝑣 )- )    (3) 
	
Here, the second term is the entropy of the distribution Q and the first term is the expected 
“energy” under Q. This has the same form as F(T) above assuming a temperature of 1 [4]. 
	
	
1.2 The role of internal energy 
	
The present interest in VFE within theoretical neuroscience is attributable to at least two 
historical influences. The first is the application of algorithms for finding low-energy states of 
matter to optimization problems [23,24], combined with the assumption that the brain 
implements a multivariate statistical model [25,26]. A second is Hopfield’s observation that the 
probability of an action potential in a neuron is a smooth (sigmoidal) function of the (short-term 
average) potential across the cell’s membrane ([27], p.2555—see Fig. 1), which is a measure of 
potential energy (per unit charge). Hopfield showed that networks whose dynamics minimize a 
global energy function can exhibit spontaneously emerging self-organizational properties useful 
for the storage of memories. Later work synthesized Hopfield’s approach with Bayesian 
inference [28], ultimately yielding models like the Helmholtz machine [29], in which online 
unsupervised learning is based explicitly on the minimization of a variational free energy, and 
more recently, variational autoencoders [2] and other energy-based models [30,31,32]. 
Analogies are, almost by definition, partial. If the connection between statistical 
mechanics and statistical modeling by the brain were merely one of analogy, it would be 
surprising to find that all the terms in the Helmholtz free energy play useful and interlocking 
representational roles. This coincidence between physical and representational descriptions is to 
                                                
5	One	criterion	for	the	goodness	of	a	model	is	its	simplicity,	which	can	be	quantified	in	terms	of	its	
Shannon	description	length.	Crucially,	this	is	equal	to	the	surprisal	associated	with	the	latent	variables	of	
the	model,	as	discussed	below.	
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be expected, however, if the free energy simply measures how much useful “representational 
work” can be done by the internal elements of a system, where “work” has its physical meaning. 
In the remainder of §1 I consider how the physical interpretation of each term in the Helmholtz 
free energy can be related to a corresponding facet of the optimization process. 
A standard expression for the Helmholtz free energy is A = U – TS. The internal energy 
U combines all the energy (potential and kinetic) residing in the system. As we have seen, the 
energy of a system in statistical mechanics is cast as an average energy over possible 
configurations, weighted by their probability. The Boltzmann distribution (Eq. 4) relates the 
energy of a state s to its probability at a given temperature: 
	𝑃(𝑠) = 	 678(9)/;<=>′678(9′)/;<=         (4)  
	
where s is a particular state of the system with energy E(s), the s’ are the other possible 
configurations of the system, 𝑘@ is Boltzmann’s constant, and T is temperature.6 Though the 
contrast is much more pronounced at lower temperatures, this equation ensures that relatively 
low-energy states are higher in probability. 
This inverse relationship between probability and energy is exploited in most uses of 
“energy” as a cost function in optimization problems. By construction, low energies are 
associated with “good” or desired configurations of the system, which are often interpretable as 
assigning high probability to what they represent. In certain types of stochastic network, the 
analogy to physics is closer still:  the energy can be directly related to the probability of an 
internal state of the network occurring, as in the Helmholtz machine trained using the stochastic 
wake-sleep algorithm [4,29], where the probability of a given hidden-layer representation h, 
given a data point v, is given by the Boltzmann distribution at the free energy minimum.  
 
	
1.3 The roles of entropy and temperature 
	
The free energy is defined by Helmholtz as that portion of a system’s available energy 
“convertible without limit into other work-equivalents” ([33], p.43). This excludes the “bound” 
portion of the energy associated with heat, represented as the product of the system’s entropy S 
and its temperature T. An intuitive explanation of the –TS term is that, insofar as the properties of 
the particles in a system are uncertain, their kinetic energy constitutes “irregular motion”, so the 
                                                
6	The	denominator 𝑠′ 𝑒CD(>E)/F<G	is	the	partition	function	Z.	The	Helmholtz	free	energy	is	equal	to	–
kBT	log	Z,	which	is	minimized	when	the	partition	function	sums	to	1.	At	this	point,	the	probability	of	a	
given	state	is	just	an	exponential	function	of	its	(negative,	scaled)	energy.	
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impact on the free energy of entropy, a “measure of the irregularity” ([33], p.56), is scaled by 
temperature (roughly, average molecular kinetic energy). 
Later formulations of entropy in statistical mechanics use a formula identical to Shannon 
entropy in information theory, apart from the scale introduced by the Boltzmann constant. Jaynes 
[34] proposes an influential interpretation of statistical mechanics according to which 
thermodynamic and information-theoretic entropy in fact “appear as the same concept” (p.621), 
and shows that the Boltzmann distribution falls out as a special case of the principle that the least 
biased distribution compatible with current knowledge is the one with maximum entropy. 
In [4] and [35], it is argued that it is preferable to use the full Helmholtz free energy as a 
cost function for learning a recognition distribution Q in a stochastic neural network, rather than 
simply setting Q to maximize the probability of picking the lowest-cost code (i.e. configuration 
of the hidden units) for an input vector v. This is because the entropy of the distribution over 
codes, which appears as “free choice” from the point of view of an information source, can be 
leveraged to communicate surplus information (i.e. beyond that needed to encode v). If we have 
two equally efficient codes for v and use them with equal probability, our choice of code 
communicates one “extra” bit of information for free. This is of course consistent with the more 
general argument considered above [34]. 
The meaning of temperature within statistical modeling is illustrated in the example of 
simulated annealing, where increasing the temperature increases the variance of the distribution 
over configurations of the system, and lowering it collapses the distribution to a small range of 
states near the ground state. Controlling the variance of a distribution is useful in many 
applications. Language models, for example, can produce much more creative and amusing, if 
not always grammatically correct, samples at high temperatures.7 Cranking up the heat decreases 
free energy, but not necessarily in a way that preserves prior knowledge encoded in the model. 
 
	
1.4 The role of equilibrium 
	
Free energy minimization has been used to explain how organisms manage to keep 
themselves away from thermodynamic equilibrium with respect to the external environment, i.e. 
how they maintain themselves in non-equilibrium steady state or homeostasis [10]. Descent into 
thermodynamic equilibrium, for an organism, is death, and entails a state of maximum entropy or 
disorganization relative to its phenotypically expected states [36]. By contrast, a relatively low 
entropy distribution over its states has been used by many researchers as a criterion for a 
system’s being alive [11,37] or “viable” [38]. It may thus seem obvious that finding the 
                                                
7	See	for	example	Andrej	Karpathy’s	well	known	essay	on	recurrent	neural	networks	at	
http://karpathy.github.io/2015/05/21/rnn-effectiveness/.	
	 7	
“equilibrium” states of a generative model (as in, e.g., [28]) cannot be coextensive with a 
thermodynamic energy-minimization process. 
A first step toward addressing this concern is to adopt a certain tripartite taxonomy of 
states. First, a steady state in the relevant sense is one in which ongoing internal processes with 
cyclical effects upon one another have evolved to a condition in which concentrations (and thus 
gradients) of relevant resources are stable—that is to say, net flows of forces into and out of the 
system’s substates are in balance. Maintaining steady state requires ongoing addition of energy 
from external sources to counter the dissipation of energy to the environment. 
A thermodynamic equilibrium state, such as the hypothetical heat-death of the universe, 
on the other hand, is only one very unusual type of steady state in which energy is maximally 
dispersed and activity all but ceases, because every microscopic exchange is perfectly balanced 
by another (“detailed balance”). A third relevant type of state, which I’ll call “excited” or 
“perturbed”, results when one begins with a steady state and adds energy in excess of that 
required to maintain homeostasis.  
After a perturbation, a system will, ceteris paribus, follow a trajectory from the perturbed 
state back to a steady state. On the other hand, steady states will begin to devolve toward 
equilibrium states if not enough energy is added to the system.8 The crucial point for present 
purposes is that the descent from a perturbed state to a steady state, and from a steady state to an 
equilibrium state, share the same rough trajectory: this series of transitions entails the system’s 
exhausting increasingly more of its potential energy, descending a free energy gradient. 
Thus, moving toward steady state is, qualitatively speaking, no different from moving 
toward equilibrium. There is still a potential problem for the identity thesis, however, in that 
energy minimization algorithms used for optimization often model physical processes in which 
the energy is taken right down to the lowest-energy or “ground” states of the system (which 
occur only at the lowest temperatures). Brains and other biological systems operate in high-
temperature regimes by comparison. 
Fortunately, statistical learning does not require that the VFE reach a global minimum. In 
absolute terms, free energy can be minimized not only during perception and perceptual learning 
but on ontogenetic and phylogenetic timescales as well [39]. Algorithms simulating only partial 
reductions in free energy are at the heart of many proven optimization techniques—see for 
example [4], in which the E-M algorithm is recast as a matter of incremental free energy 
minimization, so as to justify partial applications of the E and M steps, or contrastive divergence 
learning [40], in which the equilibrium distribution of a Restricted Boltzmann Machine is 
replaced by the distribution after just a few steps of Gibbs sampling. In this case, the contrast 
                                                
8	In	practice,	of	course,	living	systems	will	never	be	in	perfectly	steady	states,	but	rather	recovering	
toward	such	states	from	a	relative	“excess”	or	“deficiency”	of	energy.	
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between the energy induced by an input vector and the energy after a few steps of the Markov 
chain induces a gradient sufficient for learning.  
The target thesis of this paper is the claim that biological systems, whose internal states 
come to encode statistical models as a result of spontaneous self-organization in response to 
environmental pressures [41], learn and make use of these models by minimizing their physical 
free energies. The thesis does not specify precisely which approach to variational inference is 
thereby implemented, or the minimum value the VFE must take. It may be, for example, that 
biological systems run an algorithm closer to contrastive divergence than to simulated annealing. 
	
	
2 A	transparent	code	
 
2.1 Stochastic encoding and variational inference 
 
In order for the thesis of this paper to make sense, it must be kept in view that the 
generative and recognition densities of variational inference are densities over (possible) external 
causes of the sensory input. That is to say, in the parlance of most philosophers and nearly all 
cognitive scientists, they are representations, and it is their representational function that defines 
them as statistical models. Fixing the encoding of the recognition and generative densities allows 
us to directly relate the “representational work” done as the divergence between the densities is 
decreased to physical work [42]. 
In the most general formulation of the free energy principle, the generative model is not 
assumed to be directly encoded in a system’s internal states, but rather specifies which of the 
system’s states are expected under its non-equilibrium steady state distribution [9,36,43]. 
Sophisticated forms of representation and control, however, require “deep” hierarchical models 
in which explicit markings of statistical regularities at each level play the role of “sensory input” 
for the next [44]. I will therefore assume in the remainder that a generative model is at least 
implicitly encoded in a system’s internal states.  
It is typically taken for granted in discussions of predictive coding [45] that hierarchical 
generative (and recognition) models correspond to the hierarchical functional organization and 
directionality of cortical networks. For example, “backward” or top-down connections are 
supposed to parameterize the generative model, while the “forward” or bottom-up connections 
mediate recognition or fast approximate posterior inference [4,5]. In hierarchical models of this 
sort, the densities are factored across cortical layers, for example:			
	𝑝 𝑣 ℎ, 𝜃 = 	𝑝 𝑣 ℎ(K), 𝜃(L) 𝑝 ℎ(K) ℎ(M), 𝜃(M) …	𝑝 ℎ(NCK) ℎ(N), 𝜃(N)  (5) 
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where 𝑝 𝑣 ℎ, 𝜃  is the likelihood of a data point v under a generative model with parameters 𝜃(L)	and latent variables ℎ(L)	in layers 𝑙	∈ [1…𝐿]. 
Many encodings are consistent with these coarse-grained features, but the identity thesis 
entails the further constraint that the contribution of a representation (i.e. variable or parameter) 
to the VFE must be the same as the contribution to the thermodynamic free energy made by the 
degree(s) of freedom in the system that encode(s) that representation. In particular, the “energy” 
–log P(v, z) of a configuration, used as a cost for learning and inference, should equal the 
thermodynamic energy of that configuration, and the weighting of energies as well as the entropy 
determined by the recognition density Q must cohere with the actual probabilities of alternative 
states of the system. 
Classic expositions of predictive coding in the brain under the free energy principle 
[5,46] assume a deterministic representation in which densities are encoded by variables 
representing their sufficient statistics. This approach has the important consequence that, as 
noted in ([9], p.118), the variational free energy is a property of the current state of a system—
while the thermodynamic free energy is defined in terms of an expectation over an ensemble (or 
set of possible alternative states). This would seem to preclude a strict identity claim. A further 
reason to doubt that the VFE can be directly encoded in the thermodynamic free energy is that 
the latter involves a single distribution over states, whereas the VFE is characterized in terms of 
a recognition density that approximates an underlying “true” generative posterior. 
An identity thesis could be defended, however, if the VFE is encoded stochastically in a 
single thermodynamic free energy functional that combines the influence of the generative and 
recognition densities. Many early connectionist models, including the Bayesian Hopfield-style 
network analyzed in [28], the Helmholtz machine, and the Restricted Boltzmann Machine [47], 
lend themselves to a simple and natural encoding scheme under which the objective probability 
of a unit’s being in a given state represents the subjective (Bayesian, model-relative) probability 
assigned to the event represented by that state. This representation could provide the basis for a 
“transparent” encoding of variational free energy. 
To consider a system whose analysis is tractable, we may begin with the stochastic wake-
sleep algorithm, in which the activities of a single set of units representing the hidden causes of 
observations (a “total representation” in the terms of [4]) are driven bottom-up by the recognition 
weights during a “wake” phase of the algorithm and top-down by the generative weights during 
the “sleep” phase. If “wake” and “sleep” phases occur with probabilities s(wake) and s(sleep) = 1 
– s(wake) respectively,9 we can use the recognition and generative densities to define a single 
density R over configurations of the system, factored into “wake” and “sleep” cycles: 
	𝑟 𝑠S = 1 = 	𝑠 𝑤𝑎𝑘𝑒 𝑞 𝑠S = 1 + (1 − 	𝑠 𝑤𝑎𝑘𝑒 )𝑝(𝑠S = 1)   (6) 
                                                
9	Here	the	form	of	the	distribution	S	is	not	important.	In	practice,	s(sleep)	=	s(wake)	=	0.5.	
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Using this model, the identity thesis can be formulated as the claim that the VFE is equal 
to FER, the (thermodynamic) Helmholtz free energy of the system when the probabilities of the 
configurations are as given by R of Eq. (6), which specifies the (marginal) probabilities ri of each 
unit si’s firing, regardless of direction of influence. This equivalence is easily seen to hold when 
the VFE is minimized, since the recognition and generative densities will in that case be equal 
and probabilities in the network will conform to a Boltzmann distribution. 
With respect to non-equilibrium states, we may still expect FER to scale with the VFE: to 
the extent that there is nonzero K-L divergence between P and Q, the bottom-up and top-down 
drives will favor different configurations of the system, and the entropy of R and thus the 
surprisal of the internal states will be greater. There is thus more (representational) work to be 
done as the system settles toward an energy minimum.10 Moreover, lowering the entropy of R as 
FER is minimized entails lowering the internal energy, assuming a constant temperature. 
 
 
2.2 The free energy identity thesis 
 
The preceding argument is useful as a first approximation, but the phases of the wake-
sleep algorithm are biologically unmotivated [35], and, perhaps more importantly, the algorithm 
is doubly an approximation to Bayesian inference in that the update procedure for the recognition 
model does not exactly minimize the free energy used to define the cost ([48], p.17).11  
As discussed in the latter reference, the wake-sleep algorithm can be viewed as an 
approximation to the E-M algorithm, which in [3] is given an interpretation in terms of VFE 
minimization.12 The predictive coding model of [5] offers an exact implementation of E-M in 
which the “expectation” step corresponds to approximate inference of hidden causes from 
sensory input and the “maximization” step adjusts (reciprocal) synaptic weights to fit both 
generative and recognition densities to the estimated states, and thereby to the sensory input. In 
this model, the top-down influences of state or representation units at one level on error units in 
the level below (mediated by top-down synaptic weights) “instantiate the forward model” 
                                                
10 Of	course,	some	of	the	internal	energy	will	be	lost	as	heat	and	excluded	from	the	Helmholtz	free	
energy.	The	argument	given	here	assumes	that	this	“bound”	portion	of	the	energy	is	also	the	
representationally	“meaningless”	portion.	For	example,	it	ought	to	be	the	case	that	less	of	the	total	
energy	input	to	a	processing	layer	is	squandered,	to	the	extent	that	units	with	stochastic	sigmoid	
activation	functions	are	further	from	their	saturation	points. 
11	One	problem	lies	in	the	“sleep”	phase	updates,	which	in	fact	minimize	the	K-L	divergence	between	P	
and	Q,	rather	than	the	divergence	between	Q	and	P	(not	necessarily	equal)	that	appears	in	the	free	
energy.	Wake-sleep	is	fairly	effective	despite	this	and	other	approximations,	but	approximate	VFE	
minimization	obviously	will	not	do	for	our	purposes.	
12	Importantly,	E-M	computes	a	point	estimate	for	the	parameter	values.	
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(p.823), while the bottom-up connections from error units to higher-level state units implement a 
“recognition” term, which doubles as the likelihood under the generative density. Minimizing the 
VFE is equivalent to minimizing the prediction error (p.821).  
As noted above, this representation entails that the VFE depends only on the current state 
of the system. The reasoning of the previous section could, however, be extended to a model that 
has the virtues of predictive coding over wake-sleep (i.e. tied forward and backward weights and, 
if desired, lateral connections and explicitly represented prediction errors) while using a 
stochastic encoding of the variances, so that the VFE is “amortized” over alternative 
configurations of the system and thus converted into an ensemble property. 
The arguments given above may be bolstered by examining an alternative way of writing 
the variational lower bound (negative free energy) F, considered in connection with varational 
autoencoders [2]. A similar analysis occurs in the literature on the FEP and active inference [43], 
where it appears as the relation Free energy  = Complexity – Accuracy [49].13 In terms of –F or 
free energy: 
	−𝐹 =	𝐷[N(𝑄(ℎ|𝑣)||𝑃 ℎ ) − 𝑄 ℎ 𝑣 log 𝑃(𝑣|ℎ)\     (7) 
	
Maximizing the second right-hand term in (7) ensures accurate reconstruction of the 
inputs, and thus minimizes the prediction error incurred when hidden states are inferred from 
observations and then used for prediction. Minimizing the first term, the K-L divergence 
between the recognition density and the prior generative density over latent variables, ensures 
that the network will, absent external prompting, tend to occupy the same states that are sampled 
from the recognition density when the network is driven by sensory input. Together, these terms 
maximize the expected similarity between states determined by the network’s internal dynamics 
and those induced by sensory input, minimizing perturbations caused by the inputs. 
Parr et al [16] show that under certain assumptions, changes in free energy are 
approximately equal to changes in the joint surprisal of the states inside the system’s defining 
Markov blanket as well as the “active” and “sensory” states comprising the blanket.14 These 
quantities also track the amount of heat dissipated due to a corresponding change in free 
energy.15 The approximation ignores the entropy over the recognition density, which (under the 
                                                
13	Action	can	modify	the	accuracy	by	selectively	sampling	states	with	high	likelihood	under	the	
generative	model.	Thus,	not	surprisingly,	the	identity	thesis	proposed	here	extends	implicitly	to	action	as	
well	as	perception	and	cognition.	Thanks	to	Jakob	Hohwy	for	drawing	my	attention	to	this	connection.	
14	For	present	purposes,	the	“active”	and	“internal”	states	in	the	sense	relevant	to	Markov	blankets	can	
be	grouped	together	as	“hidden”	states.	
15	[16]	includes	a	precise	analysis	of	the	relationship	between	heat	and	surprisal	or	self-information,	
which	trades	on	the	fact	that	spontaneous	processes	that	involve	increases	in	entropy	are	irreversible,	
and	thus	a	system	will	not	spontaneously	follow	the	reverse	path	in	its	phase	space.	“Roughly,	the	
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assumption that the density is Gaussian near its mode) can be expected not to change much near 
non-equilibrium steady state, but otherwise this result agrees with that of the reasoning just 
rehearsed.  
Since the identity thesis requires a more far-ranging equivalence, we might attempt to 
bring the recognition entropy into the picture as follows. An overarching principle linking 
thermodynamics to variational inference, implicit in the arguments above, is that the degree of 
Bayesian updating required to maximize the inferential coherence among beliefs will (given our 
modeling assumptions) be reflected in proportional expenditures of energy in the physical sense. 
In Friston’s words, “statistical and thermodynamic efficiency go hand-in-hand” ([9], p.120). 
Learning will reduce the average size of belief updates by minimizing the divergence between 
generative and recognition densities, but it will also maximize the recognition entropy, subject to 
the constraint that the two densities converge. This provides an independent way of reducing the 
size of the updates, and so the thermodynamic energy expenditure: holding the model evidence 
constant, a “softer”, higher-entropy stochastic code requires less physical energy per code to 
represent input v using states of hidden units h than a “hard” code in which p(h|v) tends to be 
closer to 0 or 1, requiring stronger excitatory or inhibitory signaling. 
 
	
3 The	identity	thesis:	discussion	
	
3.1 From isomorphism to identity 
	
One way of attempting to express the content of the identity thesis is with the formula 
VFE = A, or in terms of dynamics, ∆𝑉𝐹𝐸 = 	∆𝐴, where A is the thermodynamic Helmholtz free 
energy. However, the arguments given above license only a mathematical interpretation of these 
equalities, not a logical interpretation in terms of strict identity. Securing the identity thesis 
proper requires more philosophical heavy machinery. 
Smart’s argument for the identity thesis [12] was essentially an appeal to Ockham’s 
razor: assuming we have evidence for compelling correlations between mental states and brain 
states, we should assume them to be identical barring specific reason not to do so. The bulk of 
Smart’s paper is dedicated to convincing the reader that there are no such defeating reasons.  
This kind of argument can be made more rigorous by appeal to David Lewis’s brand of 
functionalism [13]. Lewis begins by considering the collection of “folk” platitudes about mental 
                                                
amount	of	heat	dissipated…along	a	given	path	is	an	expression	of	how	surprising	it	would	be	to	observe	
a	system	following	the	same	path	backwards	relative	to	forwards”	(p.9).	
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states that constitute intuitive psychology. If we take the logical conjunction16 of the statements 
in this collection and replace the mental-state terms by variables, then affix appropriate 
existential quantifiers and add a Russellian uniqueness condition, the result will be a lengthy 
implicit definition of mental-state terms (technically, a modified Ramsey sentence). If mature 
neuroscience discerns brain states that precisely fit this definition, we have found the mental 
states, since in order to be a mental state it is sufficient for something to play the functional role 
described in the Ramsey sentence.  
We are now in almost precisely the position Lewis envisioned, but in place of folk-
psychological platitudes on the “right hand side” of the equation, we are using a sophisticated, 
quantitatively expressed cognitive theory, and on the “left hand side” we are appealing not so 
much to neuroscience per se as to the underlying physics, which we can relate sensibly to brain 
states thanks to theoretical advances in neural network modeling, the theory of self-organization 
and control theory [41], and non-equilibrium steady state physics [50]. 
In assuming that mental states are the internal states responsible for causing action, and a 
fortiori that they are internal states of organisms, we beg the question against a radical mind-
body dualism, according to which mental states lack spatiotemporal locations. What is exciting 
about an identity thesis in 2020, however, is not so much its opposition to Cartesian dualism 
(many these days are committed functionalists or identity theorists in any case), but (a) the fact 
that the connection between mind and body is drawn at the level of physics, undercutting even 
neuroscience as a reduction base, (b) that the reasons for which, and the precise way in which, 
the identity is realized can be discerned, at least in broad strokes, on the basis of current science, 
and (c) that the theory is, accordingly, expressed in quantitative terms. 
	
	
3.2 Scope of the thesis 
	
The free energy principle applies very broadly to any physical system that can be 
understood as possessing a Markov blanket, including brains but also simple self-regulating 
systems such as cells, larger systems such as animal populations and entire ecosystems, and 
presumably most everything in between, including, perhaps, human social institutions [11]. 
Although the arguments above focused on the case of the brain, they include in their scope any 
system in which a generative model can be regarded as stochastically encoded in the dynamics of 
                                                
16	What	Lewis	suggests	is	in	fact	not	taking	the	conjunction	of	all	folk-psychological	platitudes	as	our	
implicit	definition	but	rather	“the	conjunction	of	most	disjunctions	of	most	of	them”,	so	that	a	few	false	
platitudes	will	not	falsify	the	identity.	
	 14	
the internal elements. This seems to imply something close to panpsychism17 if one takes the sort 
of statistical inference in question to be sufficient for mentality. 
Terms of art such as “Bayesian belief” are sometimes used to frame hypotheses in 
cognitive science without commitment to such radical conclusions (cf. the subpersonal 
representations [51], low-grade forms of intentionality [52], and mere computational states of 
previous eras). One may wish to restrict the extension of the term “mind” to those systems that 
possess generative models of some specified degree of complexity, capable of supporting certain 
special classes of beliefs [20,21,27,53].18 It is not clear, however, that this strategy provides more 
than verbal comfort: if the “Bayesian beliefs” encoded in the stochastic thermodynamics of the 
human brain provide a compelling explanation of human cognition and behavior, they do so 
simply in virtue of their status as subjective probability distributions over external states, a status 
shared by the “beliefs” of protozoa. However this argument goes, mind-brain identity will fall 
out as an entailment of the (potentially broader) VFE / A identity thesis.  
Deeper than the joint in nature between complex, human-like agents and simpler ones, 
however, is that between systems whose internal models are implemented transparently by local 
interactions among their physical parts (where such interactions have typically been sculpted by 
self-organization in response to external pressures), and those in which this is not the case. 
Ensembles of neurons in biological systems provide one example of the former sort of self-
organization. Simulated neural networks exhibit the requisite computational dynamics, which 
can be expected to some extent to be reflected their thermodynamics (as exhibited in the 
overheating of a laptop used to train a deep learning model), but to the extent that software-
hardware relations in digital computers involve arbitrary conventions or inefficient use of the 
physical resources, there will be a mismatch between physical and variational energetic 
descriptions that voids application of the identity thesis. 
A second, but intimately related route to transparency appeals to the scale-free nature of 
variational free energy dynamics. As suggested in [11], the relations between global and local 
free energy minimization in a supersystem can be understood in terms of subsystems themselves 
undergoing the same energy minimization/inference process at their own scales, yielding 
hierarchies of embedded systems all of which obey the FEP19 (see [57] for an application to 
neuronal population codes). The scale-free nature of the dynamics may then, together with the 
identity thesis, provide a criterion for distinguishing minds from relatively crude simulations of 
                                                
17	In	the	sense	that	psychological	properties	would	be	universal	or	very	widespread,	in	contrast	to	a	
contemporary	usage	of	this	term	to	refer	specifically	to	a	thesis	about	consciousness.	
18	See	[54]	for	a	more	deflationary	take	on	minds.	
19 This	perspective	recalls	the	“homuncular	functionalism”	defended	in	philosophy	by	William	Lycan	[55],	
as	well	as	Leibniz’s	remark	that	“the	organic	body	of	each	living	being	is	a	kind	of	divine	machine	or	
natural	automaton,	which	infinitely	surpasses	all	artificial	automata.	For	a	machine	made	by	the	skill	of	
man	is	not	a	machine	in	each	of	its	parts”	([56],	§64). 
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them, ruling out many systems whose mentality would offend intuition most, like current 
software implementations of autoencoders, or corporations—though not electrons or solar 
systems. 
 
Conclusion 
	
In this paper, I’ve canvassed the prospects for the hypothesis that brains and other living 
systems implement variational inference as a necessary consequence of potential energy 
minimization in the thermodynamic sense. A close parallel from the history of science is the 
identification of inertial and gravitational mass, whose establishment on empirical grounds long 
antedated its theoretical explanation, thanks to the a priori distinctness of the relevant concepts.20 
In contrast to that case, I have given no axiomatic proof of the equivalence of thermodynamic 
and informational free energy, but have attempted rather to describe conditions under which such 
an identification is plausible. 
The more formal treatments in [9] and [20] demonstrate an approximate identity or 
constraint between thermodynamic potential energy and VFE near non-equilibrium steady state. 
[21] defends a position similar to the view sketched in this paper, but with differences of detail 
and interpretation. Most significantly perhaps, the isomorphism or identity advanced in the latter 
concerns the “intrinsic” and “extrinsic” information geometries of the internal states of a system, 
which together specify how changes in internal states over time map to changes in belief. The 
present argument is meant to support a slightly less abstract isomorphism or identity, directly 
between variational and thermodynamic free-energy descriptions. This argument is consistent 
with the detailed treatment of the metabolic efficiency of variational inference given in [42]. 
A key test for the identity thesis is whether a stochastic code of the kind discussed above 
turns out to be empirically plausible. This constraint on a choice of encoding for statistical 
models demonstrates one respect in which the identity thesis is theoretically useful: the 
conjunction of the latter with the FEP is a falsifiable hypothesis, even if the FEP itself is not [58]. 
Of course, the argument may run in the other direction:  strong empirical evidence for the right 
type of encoding, together with a formulation of cognitive dynamics in terms of variational 
Bayesian inference, supports the case for “variational psychophysical identity”. 
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